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The purpose of this study is to find evidence that shows that either active 
management of private pension funds in Colombia actually adds value to 
the investors or, on the contrary, investors would achieve better results if 
they invested in passively managed products such as, for example, an ETF 
(Exchange Trade Fund). After conducting a review of data available from 30 
different private pension funds in Colombia and 30 ETFs that had similar 
investment goals to these portfolios, our findings reveal that, using common 
performance indicators, a Colombian investor would have a better ROI by 
investing in passively managed products (ETFs) than in portfolios currently 
offered by voluntary pension funds in Colombia. 
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JEL Classification: G1, G10, G11  
1 This article is based on the data collected for a research project in order to fulfill the thesis requirement in 
order to obtain the degree of Especialist in Corporate Finance of Tomás Di Santo and Camilo Roncancio 
both of them former CESA graduate students.
* Autor para correspondencia.
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Evidencia de la gerencia activa 
de los portafolios de los Fondos 
Voluntarios de Pensiones en Co-
lombia: Un análisis de desempeño 
utilizando ETFs proxy
El propósito del presente estudio 
es encontrar evidencia de que la 
gerencia activa de los portafolios ad-
ministrados por los fondos privados 
de pensiones en Colombia realmente 
agrega valor a los inversionistas, o si 
por el contrario dichos inversionistas 
obtendrían mejores resultados in-
virtiendo en un producto de gerencia 
pasiva como los ETFs. Después de 
analizar los datos de 30 portafo-
lios administrados por los fondos 
de pensiones en Colombia y de 30 
ETFs que tuvieran objetivos de in-
versión similares a estos portafolios, 
el resultado obtenido fue que bajo 
medidas comunes de desempeño, el 
inversionista colombiano obtendría 
mejores rentabilidades invirtiendo en 
productos de gerencia pasiva (ETFS) 
que en los portafolios que ofrecen 
actualmente los fondos de pensiones 
voluntarias en Colombia.
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Desempeño de portafolios, gerencia 
activa, fondos voluntarios de pensio-
nes en Colombia
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Evidência de uma gestão ativa 
das carteiras de Fundos Voluntá-
rios de Pensão na Colômbia: Uma 
análise de desempenho usando 
ETFs proxy
O objetivo deste estudo é encontrar 
evidências de que a gestão activa das 
carteiras geridas por fundos de pen-
sões privados na Colômbia realmente 
agrega valor para os investidores, ou 
se, pelo contrário o investidor poderia 
obter melhores resultados investindo 
em produtos de gestão passiva, como 
os ETFs. Após analisar os dados a 
partir de 30 carteiras geridas por 
fundos de pensão na Colômbia e 
30 ETFs que tiveram objetivos de 
investimento semelhantes a estas 
carteiras, o resultado obtido foi que, 
no âmbito das medidas comuns de 
desempenho, o investidor colombiano 
obteria um melhor retorno sobre o 
investimento em produtos de gestão 
passiva (ETFS) do que nas carteiras 
que oferecem atualmente os fundos de 
pensões voluntários na Colômbia.
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Desempenho de carteiras, gestão 
ativa, fundos voluntários de pensões 
na Colômbia 
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One of the main reasons why inves-
tors invest in a particular kind of 
risky asset is to seek a higher rate of 
return rather than the one they can 
obtain by investing in a safer asset. 
Is not a secret that individual inves-
tors tend to diversify risk by holding 
a portfolio in the hope that the gains 
obtained by a particular stock or bond 
can offset the losses of others assets 
that are part of the investor´s port-
folio. Given the fact that investing in 
financial assets involves a consider-
able amount of risk and that is why 
for the average individual investor 
the cost of owning and structuring a 
diversified portfolio is quite prohibi-
tive, the common practice in that the 
individual investor seeks the help of 
specialized institutions that offers a 
range of managed portfolios (usually 
called mutual funds), where the in-
vestor can invest in tailored products 
according to his specific needs.
Of course these institutions charge a 
fee to the investors in return of the 
services offered, they usually engage 
in the process of active management 
which means that they use their cli-
ents money to buy and sell securities 
in a frequent basis in order to beat a 
specific benchmark, such as a mar-
ket or specific sector index, so they 
can obtain a higher return than the 
one observed for the benchmark in a 
similar period of time. 
In Colombia there are different kinds 
of institutions that offer these ser-
vices, being the Colombian private 
pension fund the most important one, 
if the value of assets under manage-
ment is taken into account. However, 
given the myriad of financial innova-
tion in recent years it is now possible 
for the individual investors to invest 
directly in products that mimic or 
replicate the returns of the most 
popular market indices or particular 
sector indices at a relatively low cost 
and without the risks involved in 
active management. These products 
are commonly known in the industry 
as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). 
Therefore, the purpose of the pres-
ent paper is to find evidence that the 
Colombian private pension funds 
obtain higher returns for their clients 
than the ones that can be obtained 
by investing passively in replicating 
benchmark products such as ETFs. 
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1.1. What are ETFs?
An ETF is very similar to a mutual 
fund, basically because both hold a 
portfolio of securities. The main dif-
ference between the two of them is 
that an ETF can be sold and bought 
as any common stock throughout the 
business day, whereas the net asset 
value (NAV) units of a mutual fund 
portfolio is calculated at the end of 
the day. This means that any transac-
tion of a particular investor involving 
the selling and buying of NAV units 
of a mutual fund usually takes a busi-
ness day in order to be effective, as 
opposed to an ETF transaction that 
can be done immediately at market 
prices (Gastineau, 2001). The first 
ETF was created in 1993 and was 
traded at American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX). An ETF share is simply a 
common stock that gives ownership 
over a pool of assets deposited in 
a trust. The process of creating an 
ETF is quite simple, it begins when 
a financial institution buys a portfolio 
of securities and deposits them with a 
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third party, the trustee. As a separate 
legal entity, the trustee can then issue 
commons stocks based on the value 
of the securities under custody and 
these commons stocks are given back 
to the financial institution that owns 
the portfolio so they can be traded to a 
third party of investors as ETF shares 
(Poterba and Shoven, 2002). 
One of the main features of ETFs is 
that most of them are designed to 
track a specific market or economic 
sector index. This feature is of para-
mount importance because it allows 
the individual investor to hold a stock 
that is a diversified portfolio itself 
with the features of a common stock 
transaction. This means that the 
investor can buy the ETF on margin 
or sell the ETF according to market 
perception. For example the Power-
shares QQQ (Ticker: QQQQ) ETF 
holds all the stocks that compose 
the NASDAQ-100 and the returns on 
its shares is highly correlated with 
the one of the index. However, most 
ETFs like equity mutual funds suffer 
from what is called a tracking error 
which means that the ETFs are not 
perfectly correlated with the indi-
ces they are supposed to replicate. 
However, for practical investment 
purposes the correlation tends to 
be quite high, and most of the dif-
ferences can be explained by the 
operating expenses charged by the 
ETF administrator and the bid-ask 
spread on trading days (Poterba and 
Shoven, 2002). 
The growth of the ETF industry is 
quite overwhelming, in 1995 there 
were only two ETFs available to 
investors managing one billion in 
assets, by the year 2006 this figure 
had grown to 335 billion assets dis-
tributed in more than 263 ETFs that 
covered a wide variety of market and 
sector indices as well as commodities 
benchmarks (NYSE, 2006). One of the 
factors that can explain the increas-
ingly popularity of ETFs is the fact 
that the administrators of these kind 
of products act as passive managers 
which means that they only buy and 
sell securities of the trust when the 
composition of the assets of the index 
that the ETF is trying to replicate 
changes for some reason, as opposed 
to mutual funds where the adminis-
trators act as active managers selling 
and buying stock in order to try to 
beat their respective investments 
benchmarks. This is why many in- 
vestors see the ETFs as an invest-
ment alternative that allows them 
to hold a diversified portfolio at a 
low cost with an easy benchmark to 
follow, as opposed to the traditional 
mutual fund administrators whose 
fund returns can be affected nega-
tively by bad timing and selectivity 
decisions by the fund manager. 
1.2. The Colombian private pen-
sion fund industry
In Colombia the private pension fund 
industry is quite recent compared 
with industrialized countries. It was 
just until 1993 that private pension 
fund companies in Colombia began 
their operations. Their growth in cli-
ents and assets under management 
is quite astonishing, in 1995 there 
were 1’710.865 clients affiliated or 
roughly 34% of the active economic 
population at the time, and by 2007 
the number of clients had grown to 
a staggering 7’406.882 or 55% of the 
economically active population. In 
1995 the assets of the funds totaled 
USD 262 million, by the end of 2007 
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the figure had grown to USD 25.732 
billion2 (Asofondos, 2009). 
In Colombia the private funds have a 
series of legal restrictions regarding 
the type of securities in which they 
can invest, therefore all of the funds 
practically invest in the same kind of 
portfolio which is primary composed 
by public debt, dollar denominated 
debt and highly rated Colombian 
equity (Asofondos, 2006), therefore 
the returns of each fund tends to be 
very similar to the others, given that 
the basic composition of the portfo-
lios in which the fund invest their 
client’s money is basically the same. 
However, besides the basic pension 
product that is regulated by law, the 
funds are not restricted to offer their 
clientele a wide variety of mutual 
funds in which the previously men-
tioned restrictions do not apply, and 
in which the investor is free to choose 
which investment vehicle suits his 
objectives best. This is done with the 
purpose of providing the investors an 
opportunity to explore different kind 
of investment opportunities in the 
hope of increasing the amount of their 
savings in the fund of for short-term 
gains in speculative opportunities. 
The main reason why Colombian in-
vestors prefer to invest in the mutual 
fund offered by the private pension 
fund companies rather than trough a 
brokerage firm relies on the fact that 
the amounts needed to invest are 
much smaller in the first one. Another 
reason is that for the economically 
active population, the investment 
can be done by direct discount on the 
persons payroll in a series of monthly 
installments which in turn helps the 
wage earner to reduce the amount 
of income tax that he has to be paid 
monthly based in the amount earned 
(this income tax is deduced directly 
from the person payroll by the em-
ployer who then transfers it directly 
to the government). It is important 
to mention that if an investor invest 
in a mutual fund trough its private 
pension company and keeps the in-
vestment for a period of five years the 
investor can gain the benefit of keep-
ing the money that had been saved 
from paying a lower monthly income 
tax, if instead the investor decides to 
sell its investment at an earlier time 
he losses the tax benefit and has to pay 
the amount he owes to the government 
for the monthly savings he obtained 
by a reduced income tax. Usually the 
persons that invest in these kinds of 
products are the ones with the higher 
incomes and this alone can explain 
for the increasing demand of mutual 
funds administered by Colombian 
private pension fund companies. This 
demand is supported by their growth 
in clients and assets under manage-
ment, in 1995 there were just 12.171 
clients for this kind of products, by 
2007 the number of clients grew to 
340.905. In 1995 the assets of the 
mutual funds under management by 
Colombian private pensions compa-
nies totaled barely USD 37 million 
by the end of 2007 the figure grew to 
USD 3.308 billion3 (Asofondos, 2009). 
One distinctive feature is that most 
2 These figures are calculated using the official exchange rate for the dates 31/12/1995 and 31/12/2007, 
which were USD/COP=$987,65 and USD/COP=$2.014,76 respectively.
3 These figures are calculated using the official exchange rate for the dates 31/12/1995 and 31/12/2007, 
which were USD/COP=$987,65 and USD/COP=$2.014,76 respectively.
%VIDENCE OF ACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE 6OLUNTARY 0ENSION &UNDS IN #OLOMBIA 
! PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS USING PROXY %4&S
 %345$)/3'%2%.#)!,%3  6OL  .O  s !BRIL  *UNIO DE 
of the mutual funds managed by 
these companies are actively man-
aged with a well defined investment 
objective. Therefore, the question to 
bear in mind is that if the mutual 
funds administered actively by these 
companies provide superior returns 
that passively managed products 
such as ETFs? 
  ,)4%2!452% !.$ 
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The literature concerning the evalu-
ation of mutual fund performance 
is mostly based in the assumptions 
stated by the Efficient Market Hy-
pothesis (EMH). In its basic form, 
the hypothesis states that for the in-
dividual investor it is very difficult to 
beat the market (or a market portfolio) 
because all the publicly available in-
formation given to a group of compet-
ing investors is already fully priced in 
the particular securities that compose 
each investor’s portfolio, therefore 
since all the prices already reflects the 
market sentiment is impossible for an 
individual investor to obtain superior 
performance based on the same infor-
mation that is also available to other 
competitors (Fama, 1970). 
Of course this hypothesis is not 
popular among investors and port-
folio managers whose job depends 
in providing results that beat the 
average market performance (Varami 
and Kalash, 2008). The empirical evi-
dence concerning the EMH has been 
widely documented and with diverse 
results. The first studies concerning 
mutual fund performance provided 
support to the EMH. 
One of the first studies was conducted 
by William Sharpe using a measure 
of total risk-return performance for 
34 funds for the period between 1945 
and 1953 that concluded that in av-
erage the funds underperformed the 
Dow Jones industrial index for the 
same period (Sharpe, 1966). These 
results were confirmed by Michael 
Jensen who used the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) in order to 
find the expected return for a set of 
mutual funds between the period of 
1945 and 1964. By comparing the ex-
pected equilibrium return according 
to the CAPM and its deviation from 
the funds actual returns, the conclu-
sion was that the vast majority of the 
funds observed had negative alphas.4 
This particular finding implied that 
by that specific measure, the funds 
underperformed the market index for 
the period under observation (Jensen, 
1968). 
Also, by using a systematic risk-
return approach Jack L. Treynor 
came to the same conclusions than 
the previous studies found (Treynor, 
1966). However, throughout the 
years several researchers have found 
evidence that contradicts some of the 
postulates of the EMH.
For example, certain studies have 
found statistical evidence that small 
capitalization mutual funds in the US 
have beaten the market benchmark 
on a risk-adjusted basis for the period 
between 1994-2007 (Varami and Ka-
lash, 2008). 
In the case of index mutual funds 
(a passively managed product with 
4 Alpha is obtained by substracting the fund actual return by the expected return obtained using the 
CAPM.
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similar characteristics to open mu-
tual funds), there is evidence that by 
using risk-adjusted and transaction 
cost measures, these index funds 
tend to perform better than actively 
managed funds on average (Frino and 
Gallagher, 2001). 
On the other hand, the literature con-
cerning the performance of ETFs is 
very scarce. The research conducted 
until know has been focused around 
the issues of liquidity and transac-
tion costs. One of the studies on the 
subject points out that these products 
(ETFs) are not attractive to small 
investors due to higher transaction 
costs than the ones those investors 
will incur with index mutual funds 
(Dellva, 2001). Another study shows 
that ETFs allow investors to sell their 
investments at market prices at any 
point in time, which in a certain way 
offset the higher transaction costs 
that are associated with buying and 
selling ETFs shares (Kostovetsky, 
2003). 
On the international side little has 
been writen regarding ETFs, but 
about the performance of US based 
international equity mutual funds, 
one study concluded that these funds 
did not provided either individually 
or in average a performance that 
surpassed the return obtained by 
a benchmark equity index for the 
period observed between 1982-1988 
(Cumby and Glen, 1990). 
Although, there is not enough litera-
ture regarding the subject of market 
efficiency in the specific case of ETFs, 
is a fact that these products are usu-
ally tied to the performance of major 
market index. It is in this context, 
that the present study would seek 
proof if indeed the actively managed 
Colombian private pension mutual 
funds can outperform passive man-
aged investments benchmarks which 
in this study would be ETFs. 
For the purpose of this paper, the 
passive managed investment bench-
marks would be chosen from the 
ETFs available in the market. The 
ETFs would be selected on the basis 
that their respective investment 
objectives are similar to those of the 
Colombian private pension mutual 
funds under study.  
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3.1. Sharpe ratio
This is one of the most widely used 
techniques for calculating the risk-
adjusted return of a portfolio or 
mutual fund. The reasoning behind 
the measure is that it allows the 
investor to perceive how many units 
of return there are per units of risk. 
(Sharpe, 1966) One of the criticisms 
surrounding this measure is that the 
standard deviation is a very naïve 
approach in measuring risk (Bogle J., 
1998). The measure will also overes-
timate results in securities that not 
behave like the normal distribution. 
Besides these problems, the Sharpe 
ratio is still one of the most popular 
techniques for comparing risk-ad-
justed returns. The formula used to 
calculate the Sharpe ratio is: 
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Where Rp is the average return of the 
portfolio for a specific holding period, 
Rf   is the proxy for the risk free rate 
for a specific holding period and  is 
the standard deviation of the portfolio 
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for a specific holding period. General-
ly having investments with a higher 
Sharpe ratio than their benchmarks 
is good. The logic being that with a 
higher Sharpe ratio, the investor is 
obtaining more units of returns per 
units of risk assumed. 
3.2. Jensen’s alpha
The Jensen´s alpha evaluates the 
performance of an investment in 
terms of excess return over the theo-
retical return of the portfolio using 
the CAPM. Since the CAPM return 
is risk-adjusted, this means that for a 
higher risk we should expect a higher 
return. The measure is obtained by 
subtracting the actual return of a 
portfolio from the excepted return 
of that portfolio obtained using the 
CAPM. The result obtained is com-
monly known as the Jensen alpha 
(Jensen,1968). Therefore, a positive 
alpha means that the portfolio over 
performed relative to its theoretical 
expected return. On the contrary, a 
negative alpha means that the port-
folio underperformed relative to its 
theoretical expected return. The for-
mula used to calculate the Jensen´s 
Alpha is: 
Where Rp is the average return of the 
portfolio for a specific holding period, 
Rf is the proxy for the average risk 
free rate for a specific holding period 
and βp is the coefficient of regression 
of the portfolio as a dependent vari-
able versus the market proxy as an 
independent variable for a specific 
holding period and Rm is the aver-
age for the proxy of market return 
for a specific holding period. One of 
the main problems of this measure 
is that the betas obtained tend to 
be unstable for different periods of 
time. This instability in beta can 
lead us to overstate the amount of 
systematic risk (very high betas) in 
periods of market turbulence. In the 
same way, unstable betas can lead us 
to understate the benefits of contra- 
rian strategies (shorting the stock) 
in times of market turbulence (Jones 
and Yeoman, 2001). 
3.3. Treynor ratio
The Treynor ratio is calculated 
practically in the same way as the 
Sharpe ratio, the main difference 
being that it uses the systematic risk 
of a particular portfolio as measured 
by βp as opposed to the portfolio vari-
ance which is used in the Sharpe 
ratio. It is primarily used to com-
pare the performance of a particular 
sub-portfolio to the one of a larger 
portfolio of similar characteristics 
that is more diversified (in the sense 
that the larger portfolio holds more 
securities than the sub-portfolio 
that is under observation) (Treynor, 
1996). The interpretation is the same 
as the Sharpe ratio but in units of 
systematic risk. The problems with 
this performance measure are very 
similar with the ones encountered us-
ing the Sharpe ratio or the Jensen´s 
alpha. The formula used to calculate 
the Treynor ratio is: 
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Where Rp is the average return of 
the portfolio for a specific holding 
period, Rf is the proxy for the risk 
free rate for a specific holding period 
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and  is the coefficient of regression 
of the portfolio as a dependent vari-
able versus the market proxy as an 
independent variable for a specific 
holding period. 
3.4. Modigliani and Modigliani 
(M-Squared) measure
The M-Squared measure is different 
from the other measures because it 
calculates the performance of a spe-
cific investment in terms of real re-
turns rather than in units. Therefore 
the interpretation is straightforward 
in the sense that the investment 
with the highest M-Squared is the 
one with the best performance. This 
distinct attribute of the M-Squared 
measure makes it easier for the in-
vestor to make comparison between 
different investments. The formula 
used to calculate the M-Squared 
measure is: 
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Where Rp is the average return of the 
portfolio for a specific holding period, 
Rf is the proxy for the risk free rate 
for a specific holding period and   is 
the standard deviation of the portfolio 
for a specific holding period and   is 
the standard deviation of the market 
proxy for a specific holding period 
(Modigliani, & Modigliani, 1997). 
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The data for the study comes from 
three private Colombian pension 
funds companies. The data was 
gathered from 30 different open 
mutual funds with different invest-
ment objectives for an observed time 
period. By analyzing the portfolio 
composition of the Colombian mutual 
funds, a group of ETFs were selected 
to serve as benchmarks to those open 
mutual funds. The benchmark ETFs 
were selected on the basis that their 
respective investments objectives 
were similar to those of the assets of 
the open mutual funds under study. 
These similarities between composi-
tions and investment objectives can 
be observed in Appendix A. 
From the appendix is observed that 
the differences between the dates are 
mainly due to the fact that either the 
benchmark ETF or the Colombian 
mutual fund began their operations 
on that specific date. It is important 
to remember that ETFs are a rapidly 
expanding industry that just until 
recent years is catching up to the 
myriad of products offered by the US 
mutual fund industry. 
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In order to measure the actual per-
formance for each fund under study 
relative to their benchmark ETF, the 
following adjustments were made to 
the data under study:
1. Since the study is done from the 
Colombian investor point of view 
all the data was converted to 
Colombian pesos in order to take 
into account the variability of the 
USD/COP exchange rate.5 
2. For each ETF the closing price of 
a specific date was multiplied by 
the USD/COP exchange rate for 
that date (in Table 1., Column 
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1 multiplied by Column 4). The 
result of this operation is the 
value of an ETF share in COP 
(Column 6).
3. The NAV for each fund is calcu-
lated at the end of the business 
day and is reported in Colombian 
pesos by the fund´s management 
(Column 2).
4. The daily average proxy for the 
risk free rate was calculated us-
ing the weekly average for the 
one-year Cerificate of Deposit 
(CD) in the Colombian money 
market6 for the different periods 
of time under study (the aver-
age of Column 8 for an observed 
period).
5.  The Betas and the other 
descriptive statistics of the 
study were obtained by using 
the discrete daily returns for 
each of the time series under 
observation (a simple linear 
regression obtained by the re-
turns exhibited in Column 5 as 
the independent variable and 
the ones in Column 7 as our 
dependent variable).
6. The periods of observation are 
not long enough to obtain the 
Colombian tax benefit, so the re-
turns can be comparable without 
this leverage effect. 
The results of the study are ob-
tained by calculating the common 
performance measures for both the 
Colombian private pension fund and 
comparing them with their respective 
benchmarks. The portfolio return 
and the market proxy return are 
obtained by the averages of Column 
3 and Column 8 for the period under 
observation for each portfolio and 
ETF under study.  
6 (Banco de la República: Colombia, 2008)
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6.1. Mutual funds managed by 
ING
The results obtained for the funds 
managed by ING Colombia in com-
parison with their respective ETFs 
benchmark were the following:7  
In the case of ING, two of the portfo-
lios failed to reject the null hypothesis 
at the 95% confidence level that their 
respective betas have some relation 
/>LiÊÓ°ÊÛ`iViÊvÊ>VÌÛiÊ>>}iiÌÊÕÃ}ÊVÊ«iÀvÀ>ViÊi>ÃÕÀiÃÊ
LÞÊvÕ`ÃÊ>>}i`ÊLÞÊ °Ê
7 The first column contains the performance measures, the second column are the results for a specific 
portfolio, the third column are the results for a specific ETF benchmark as defined by Appendix A and 
the fourth column can be interpreted as follows. DEFFICIENT=lack of evidence of active management 
by the pension funds management EFFICIENT=evidence of active management by the pensions fund 
management Not conclusive=fail to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between a fund and its res-
pective benchmark measured by beta.
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with the benchmark (high liquidity 
and fixed income). Therefore, risk-
adjusted measures based on betas 
(Jensen and Treynor) can’t be taken 
into account  to do the analysis when 
the beta confidence level is below 
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95%. In the case of portfolios with 
negative betas (moderate and ag-
gressive) the Treynor ratio is mean-
ingless since it attributes negative 
performances with superior returns 
(Georges, 2005). 
However by using variance mea-
sures such as the Sharpe ratio and 
M-Squared there is strong evidence 
that for the period under observation 
ING’s active portfolio management 
did not provide superior returns to 
its investors. 
6.2. Mutual funds managed by 
Protección S.A.
The results obtained for the funds 
managed by Protección Colombia 
in comparison with their respective 
ETFs benchmark were the follow-
ing: 
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In the case of Protección S.A., it can 
be observed that nine of the mutual 
funds as well as eight of their respec-
tive benchmarks exhibited negative 
returns for the period under study (M-
Squared measure). Three of the portfo-
lios failed to reject the null hypothesis 
that their respective betas have some 
relation with the benchmark. Another 
three portfolios also exhibit negative 
betas but with high confidence levels, 
this means that these three portfolios 
can be somehow inversely correlated 
with their respective benchmarks. 
However, there is evidence that in all 
of the active managed portfolios by 
Protección S.A., none of these funds 
were able to beat their respective 
benchmarks on a risk-adjusted basis 
for the period under study. 
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The only exception is the mutual fund 
of Japanese stocks, which exhibited 
a slightly better performance than 
its benchmark using the M-Squared 
measure. It is interesting that in 
eight cases the mutual funds and 
seven of their benchmarks exhibited 
negative returns (M-Squared). None 
of Protección mutual funds under the 
period of study was able to outper-
form the average risk-free rate for 
the same period. 
6.3. Mutual funds managed by 
BBVA 
The results obtained for the funds 
managed by BBVA Colombia in com-
parison with their respective ETFs 
benchmark were the following: 
In the case of BBVA, it can be observed 
that just two of the mutual funds and 
three of the benchmarks exhibited 
negative returns for the period under 
study. Five of the portfolios failed to 
reject the null hypothesis that their 
respective beta has some relation with 
the benchmark. These five portfolios 
also have negatives betas. The rest 
of the portfolios have positive betas 
and rejected the null hypothesis at 
the chosen confidence level of 95%. As 
mentioned before, the Treynor ratio 
is useless in the case of the portfolios 
that exhibit negative betas. 
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Also it is important to mention that 
five of the portfolios managed by 
BBVA8 outperformed their bench-
mark in terms of absolute returns. 
However, there is evidence that just 
two of the nine actively managed 
portfolios by BBVA were able to 
beat their respective benchmarks on 
a risk-adjusted basis for the period 
under study. The balanced and global 
portfolios outperformed the bench-
mark in all performance measures, 
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8 The portfolios that beat their respective benchmarks in terms of absolute returns are: Balanced, Money, 
Enterprises, Global and Premium.
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with the exception of the Treynor 
ratio in the global portfolio, which 
in this particular case is inconclusive 
due to the presence of a negative Beta 
that failed to reject the null hypoth-
esis of no relationship between the 
variables. 
  #/.#,53)/.3
After considering the results obtained 
in the study, there is evidence that by 
using common performance measures 
just two of the 30 Colombian mutual 
funds under study were able to beat a 
market benchmark on a risk-adjusted 
basis. These results are consistent 
with the empirical evidence found 
in the literature that in general and 
with a few exceptions active manag-
ers are able to outperform a market 
benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Therefore, a Colombian investor 
will be better off by investing in a 
passively managed ETF than in an 
actively managed Colombian private 
pension open mutual fund with simi-
lar investment objectives. However, 
there is evidence than in 10 of the 
30 cases under study, the Betas of 
the mutual funds were statistically 
insignificant. This means that com-
mon performance measures such as 
the Jensen’s alpha and the Treynor 
ratio do not have enough statistical 
strength to be considered as meaning-
ful performance measures in these 
specific cases. However, in the re-
mainder cases the performances mea-
sures are statically found on a daily 
basis return. Finally, it is important 
to mention that since the ETFs and 
the Colombian private open mutual 
funds industries are relatively new, 
there is not enough data to conduct 
a study on a monthly basis which is 
the usual practice for this kind of 
research. The results obtained can 
set the ground for further research 
in the relevance and the role of active 
portfolio managers in Colombia as 
well as other topics regarding market 
efficiency in Colombia. 
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